China and Russia Issue New World Order Declaration: All Talk, No Action

Russia and China just released two documents outlining how they want to remake the world order and displace the United States as the leader of the global system. The documents are heavy on aspirations but absent any means of achieving those goals.

One of the key themes in the documents is increased defense cooperation. However, there is still no mutual defense agreement between the two countries. Essentially, the documents confirm what China and Russia want and what they have already been doing, while the United States remains the world’s leading economic, military, and diplomatic power.

On May 20, 2026, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin met the press at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing following two days of talks. The visit marked Putin’s 25th trip to China. The summit produced two distinct joint statements, issued simultaneously as a package, along with more than 40 bilateral agreements. The first was a Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation, which focused on the practical bilateral relationship.

The second was a Joint Declaration on Advocating a Multipolar World and New Types of International Relations, ideological in nature and targeted at the existing U.S.-led international order. The two sides also agreed to extend the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the China-Russia strategic partnership.

The bilateral statement deepens cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and China in transport, logistics, digitalization, e-commerce, and agricultural trade, and links the Eurasian Economic Union development plans to the Belt and Road Initiative. Russia reaffirmed the one-China principle, recognizing Taiwan as an integral part of China and supporting Beijing’s actions to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The statement also commits both sides to expanding joint military exercises, increasing air and maritime coordination, and strengthening cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The only genuinely new and concrete outcome was a separate agreement to build a second railway line through the Zabaikalsk-Manzhouli crossing, an actual infrastructure project backed by a signed deal.

The military language falls well short of a defense alliance. There is no Article 5-style collective defense clause, no obligation for either country to come to the other’s aid, no defined trigger for military intervention, no integrated command structure, no basing rights, no pre-positioned forces, and no shared nuclear doctrine. Joint exercises and military-to-military contacts already existed.

The Power of Siberia gas pipeline, the EAEU-BRI linkage, and yuan-ruble trade settlement mechanisms all predate the summit. These documents largely ratify a relationship that already exists rather than create something new. The primary audience is not Moscow or Beijing, but Washington, Brussels, and the Global South.

The multipolarity declaration contains no enforcement mechanism, no new institution, no funding structure, no timeline, and no defined membership. Russia needs the multipolarity narrative to reinforce its great-power status after the war in Ukraine. China needs it as political cover for displacing U.S. primacy in Asia. Neither country has produced a viable replacement for the existing order. BRICS has no military component, no common currency, and no binding dispute-resolution mechanism.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization remains a consultative forum. Neither Russia nor China is willing to subordinate itself to a supranational body capable of constraining its behavior, making genuine institutional multipolarity structurally self-defeating. What both countries want is multipolarity for others and freedom of action for themselves.

The declaration’s call for nuclear-weapons states to abandon joint nuclear mission schemes targets NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, under which U.S. nuclear weapons are stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Russia has opposed the arrangement since the 1990s; China objects because the system makes its own nuclear buildup appear disproportionate.

Ending it would require unanimous NATO approval, action by the U.S. Congress, and the dismantling of extended deterrence commitments. The demand is included to establish a political narrative and generate domestic pressure in countries such as Germany and Belgium, where anti-nuclear political constituencies exist.

The anti-hegemony, anti-sanctions, and anti-neocolonialism language allows Russia to portray Western sanctions over Ukraine as imperial aggression. China uses it to cultivate Global South neutrality in any future confrontation over Taiwan, through Belt and Road financing and development rhetoric. The language is broad enough for African, Latin American, and Southeast Asian governments to endorse without committing to concrete action. Most Global South governments operate transactionally, accepting Chinese infrastructure financing and Russian grain or fertilizer while maintaining IMF relationships, dollar-denominated trade, and Western security partnerships. India participates in Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits and buys discounted Russian oil while conducting Quad exercises with the U.S. Navy.

The Ukrainian language has appeared in every Russia-China joint statement since February 2022. The phrase “root causes” is Russian diplomatic shorthand for the position that NATO expansion and Western support for Kyiv must end before negotiations.

China endorses the language because it costs Beijing nothing while keeping Russia dependent on Chinese trade and political backing, and preserves Beijing’s image of neutrality, allowing it to continue trading with both Russia and Europe. No joint statement since 2022 has produced a negotiating framework, a ceasefire proposal, or any mechanism for implementation.