Should Venezuela Be Considered Part of ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’? Is History Repeating Itself?
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Just as we have identified in Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Chile, China has also extended predatory lending practices to Venezuela, effectively mortgaging the country’s future in its favor.
Not only have they helped keep the regime afloat, but they have also strengthened it through state-run digital surveillance systems designed to monitor and identify citizens, further exacerbating corruption.
Should Venezuela now be viewed as part of a modern form of ‘gunboat diplomacy’?
History may not repeat itself completely, but it does rhyme. In the early 1900s, European powers used naval pressure to demand debt payments from Hispanic American nations. Today, China uses debt, surveillance technology, and economic dependence to obtain lasting influence over Venezuelan sovereignty without firing a single shot. The result is a softer, yet deeper, form of control.
China is not only Venezuela’s largest creditor. It is now one of the regime’s main enablers. Through Huawei, ZTE, and the digital identification system of the Carnet de la Patria, Beijing has helped build a national digital monitoring network that strengthens the regime’s ability to identify, track, and repress the opposition.
🇪🇸 ANÁLISIS | ¿Debe considerarse a Venezuela parte de la ‘diplomacia de las cañoneras’? ¿Se repite la historia?
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China has also established dual-use space telemetry and ISR facilities on Margarita Island and in El Sombrero, linking Venezuela to its broader tracking platforms in Argentina and the Southern Hemisphere. These facilities give Beijing an intelligence and surveillance foothold in the Caribbean basin.
The recent zero-tariff agreement between China and Venezuela, announced almost simultaneously with the U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, deepens this dependency. It functions as a mechanism to evade sanctions, pushing Venezuela even further into China’s economic orbit and positioning it as a commercial and logistical gateway for Chinese goods into the region.
Under the oil-for-loans scheme, Venezuela exports crude while importing technology, goods, and political reinforcement. Sovereignty is not surrendered in appearance, but gradually in practice.
This alignment is not limited to China. Russia maintains billions of dollars in military equipment and an advisory presence. Iran operates financial networks and drone factories linked to its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas.
Cuban security services continue to occupy Venezuela’s intelligence and counterintelligence institutions. Together, these actors form an authoritarian four-pillar structure: Chinese capital and digital control, Russian military hardware, Iranian financial and drone networks, and Cuban regime protection.
However, none of these external powers can protect Maduro from U.S. military pressure. China can provide economic lifelines, surveillance architecture, and a diplomatic shield, but it cannot deter or counter the naval and air dominance of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Its influence penetrates deeply into Venezuela’s political and economic system, but not into hemispheric defense posture.
So yes, Venezuela is part of a modern form of ‘gunboat diplomacy.’ But it is inverted in nature. The gunboats are not forcing Venezuela to pay its debts. They are signaling that the strategic capture of a hemispheric state by external powers through debt, surveillance, and authoritarian enablement is a red line.
History is not repeating itself under European fleets; it is unfolding under digital surveillance networks, opaque lending, and the silent erosion of sovereignty.
Under the veil of economic development, they continue offering loans tied to oil agreements. China is, and has long been, Venezuela’s largest creditor, based on this oil-for-loans scheme dating back to the 2007–2017 period.
China has adjusted repayment schedules and relaxed certain terms, but it still maintains firm control over Venezuela’s long-standing debt.
It has established listening posts on Margarita Island and helps the regime maintain control over dissidents through its technology and national digital surveillance systems.
How coincidental is it that, just weeks after this military armada began its demonstrations in the Caribbean, China unveiled a zero-tariff trade agreement with Venezuela?
All of this took place during the Shanghai Trade Expo. In doing so, China eliminated tariffs on more than 400 categories of Chinese and Venezuelan goods.
If this is not an attempt to undermine existing U.S. sanctions on Venezuela, then once again, China is intervening to fill the vacuum, effectively taking over the Venezuelan economy.
Under the oil-for-loans scheme, the only significant product Venezuela sends to China is oil. Very little else leaves the country, which means Chinese products will become the backbone of the Venezuelan economy.
These zero-tariff agreements would only be a temporary patch—useful for a time, but ultimately creating even deeper dependence on China.
Beijing has already strengthened its grip on Venezuela. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) estimates that over the last two decades, China has extended more than $60 billion in loan agreements, which Venezuela has only been able to repay through shipments of oil and derivatives.
Venezuela also hosts another Chinese post in El Sombrero, in Guárico state. This facility integrates with China’s space station in Argentina (Deep Space), providing equatorial (VZ) and Southern Hemisphere (AR) coverage for Beijing’s satellite tracking and missile capabilities.
Needless to say, Putin and his team have positioned another $12 billion in military equipment in Venezuela, which Russian personnel frequently maintain to ensure it remains operational and potentially transferable in the event of a regime change.
Additionally, let us not forget that Cuba’s Praetorian Guard continues to manage all of Venezuela’s intelligence institutions. And to complete the picture, Iran and its proxies (Hamas and Hezbollah) also use Venezuela as a financial hub and a regional point of entry and exit.
With the Iranian drone factory operational since 2007, and with Venezuela’s vast uranium resources, Iran is also deeply involved in the country.
In the end, despite China’s auxiliary moves, it cannot defend Maduro against the hard power of the United States.
China has historically condemned U.S. deployments; it did so again this past August, just as it did in 2019.
So history does repeat itself; only this time it is not European powers, but China projecting influence in Hispanic America once again.
LTC Octavio Pérez, US Army (Ret.), co-founder and senior member, MSI²
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Originally published by the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute, a conservative and nonpartisan think tank specializing in policy research, strategic intelligence, and consulting. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Institute. For more information, visit www.miastrategicintel.com
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of Gateway Hispanic.
About The Author
Octavio Pérez
El Teniente Coronel Octavio Pérez es un oficial de inteligencia del Ejército de los Estados Unidos con amplia experiencia, acumulando más de dos décadas de servicio activo y asignaciones adicionales en la reserva. Se especializó en inteligencia y en Guerra Nuclear, Biológica y Química, comandando operaciones en Fort Leonard Wood y prestando servicio en la República de Corea. En la Agencia de Inteligencia de Defensa (DIA), se centró en el análisis militar de Corea del Norte y respondió a crisis relacionadas con los incidentes del Achille Lauro y del vuelo TWA 847. Pérez se ofreció como voluntario con la 1.ª División de Caballería durante la operación Desert Shield/Storm y posteriormente se desempeñó como Jefe de Instructores de Inteligencia en la Escuela de las Américas del Ejército de EE. UU., formando a oficiales hispanoamericanos en conflictos de baja intensidad. Su carrera en la reserva culminó en el Comando Sur de EE. UU. como oficial de inteligencia estratégica (J2 Ops).
Lt. Colonel Octavio Perez is a highly experienced U.S. Army intelligence officer with more than two decades of active-duty service and additional reserve assignments. He specialized in intelligence and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare, commanding operations at Fort Leonard Wood and serving in the Republic of Korea. At the Defense Intelligence Agency, he focused on North Korean military analysis and responded to crises involving the Achille Lauro and TWA 847 incidents. Perez volunteered with the 1st Cavalry Division during Desert Shield/Storm and later served as Chief Intelligence Instructor at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, training Hispanic American officers in low-intensity conflict. His reserve career culminated at U.S. Southern Command as a strategic intelligence officer (J2 Ops).